2023 Research and Study
- NEWCommentary
- publication date:2026/03/31
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective（11）” How Should We Understand the “After Iran, Turkey” Argument? A Turkish Perspective on the War Against Iran
MEIJ Commentary No.22
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective （11）”
Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes, tensions in the Middle East have escalated further. In response to these developments, this commentary series, titled Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective, brings together analyses by members of the study group, each examining the current situation from the standpoint of their own regional and disciplinary expertise, while considering its background and implications.
How Should We Understand the “After Iran, Turkey” Argument? A Turkish Perspective on the War Against Iran
Mayu KANEKO,
Senior Research Fellow, Middle East Institute of Japan
Why Is There an “After Iran, Turkey” Argument?
Since the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, debate has once again intensified in Turkey and beyond over whether Turkey could become the next country Israel regards as a major threat. This line of argument had already surfaced after the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, when Iranian and Russian influence in Syria receded and Turkey’s presence there grew more pronounced. In that process, Israel increasingly came to view Turkey as a major regional competitor, and tensions between the two countries rose accordingly. However, with U.S. involvement, bilateral talks aimed at preventing accidental military clashes in Syria later moved forward, and the “after Iran, Turkey” narrative temporarily subsided.
This debate, however, is rooted in the longer history of Turkish-Israeli relations, which have repeatedly oscillated between crisis and rapprochement. The Palestinian issue has consistently been the principal trigger of bilateral crises, whereas cooperation in such practical areas as trade, the economy, and energy has tended to facilitate improvement. Indeed, after Turkey shifted toward repairing ties with neighboring states in 2022, its relations with Israel also began to improve. President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Netanyahu held direct talks on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2023 and agreed to pursue reciprocal visits. Despite their fundamental disagreement over the Palestinian issue, both sides sought, at least for the time being, to prioritize practical interests and move the relationship forward. Yet the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, followed by the escalation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, abruptly reversed this trend. Although Turkey was initially restrained in its response, it adopted a more confrontational stance as Israel’s military campaign intensified, and bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly.
Against this backdrop, the view of Turkey as a threat gained renewed traction within Israel. In February 2026, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett described Turkey as “the new Iran,” arguing that “we must act simultaneously against the threat from Tehran and the hostility from Ankara.” Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant likewise argued that Turkey sees Iran’s weakening as an opportunity to expand its own influence, warning in particular about Turkey’s growing regional role, especially in Syria. BBC Monitoring also noted that, following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, debate spread among Turkish media outlets and commentators over whether “Turkey is next after Iran.” For example, even the pro-government daily Sabah featured commentary stressing the need for preparedness on the assumption of a possible Turkey-Israel confrontation. In other words, this debate is not merely a conspiracy theory; it is sustained by the fact that some Israeli politicians and commentators have begun openly portraying Turkey as a new regional rival and even as an imminent threat.
This context is also shaped by Israeli domestic politics. With the general election scheduled for autumn 2026 approaching, former Prime Minister Bennett is widely seen as a strong challenger to Prime Minister Netanyahu. In that setting, presenting Turkey as a new threat in the “post-Iran” era serves as a clear and effective domestic political message. In particular, Turkey’s strong support for Palestine, the sharpening of its anti-Israel posture, its expanding influence in Syria, and its stronger ties with Arab states are seen by some on the Israeli right not only as signs that Turkey is a competitor in the struggle over regional order, but also as evidence that it is a power capable of exerting pressure on Israel while expanding its influence across the region. The “after Iran, Turkey” argument, therefore, should be understood less as an immediate call for military action against Turkey than as a discourse shaped by Israeli concerns over shifting regional power balances after Iran’s weakening, combined with the logic of domestic political mobilization.
How Is Turkey Responding?
How, then, has Turkey responded to these Israeli reactions? In short, even as the “Iran first, Turkey next” narrative has spread both inside and outside the country, Turkey appears intent on avoiding becoming a direct party to the conflict. At least for now, its response has been centered on restraint and diplomacy. While condemning the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran as “illegal and lacking legitimacy,” Turkey has prioritized containment and the resumption of negotiations. President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Fidan have continued consultations with the United States, Iran, and Arab countries in an effort to prevent the conflict from escalating into a regional war. Moreover, at least with regard to Syria, Turkey has maintained working-level coordination aimed at preventing accidental clashes with Israel, thereby avoiding being drawn needlessly into Israeli provocations or a broader confrontational framework. In other words, although Turkey has intensified its criticism of Israel, it has adopted a pragmatic approach that prioritizes crisis management and the protection of its own security interests rather than allowing the situation to escalate immediately into full-scale confrontation.
At the same time, the heavy degradation of Iran’s air defense system during the so-called “12-Day War” in June 2025 had a major impact on Turkey. At that stage, however, Ankara could still treat it as a lesson drawn from a war taking place in a neighboring country. By contrast, during the present war, incidents occurred on both March 4 and March 9 in which ballistic munitions launched from Iran approached Turkish airspace, exposing Turkey itself to direct danger. Although both were intercepted by NATO air and missile defense units, the significance of Turkey having experienced this directly as a threat to its own security should not be underestimated. These incidents drove home the point that strengthening air defense was no longer a long-term issue, but an urgent security priority.
As a result, Turkey has accelerated efforts to build its own multilayered air defense architecture. The Erdoğan government has identified the domestically developed integrated air defense concept known as the “Steel Dome” (Çelik Kubbe) as a central pillar of defense modernization from 2025 onward. Under the leadership of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), it has signed additional contracts worth a total of $6.5 billion with major domestic firms such as ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, underscoring its emphasis on building a national air defense network. Nevertheless, such development does not immediately translate into sufficient operational capability. What the recent missile incidents have shown is that, while Turkey is moving ahead with the long-term development of an indigenous air defense network, it still faces difficulty ensuring adequate protection of its airspace in the short term without NATO support.
Indeed, after the interceptions, NATO reinforced its missile defense posture, and on March 10, 2026, additional U.S. Patriot systems were deployed around the Kürecik base in Malatya Province. These developments underscore the extent to which Turkey still relies heavily on NATO support in the field of air and missile defense at the present stage. In sum, Turkey’s response has had two dimensions: while it has fundamentally relied on diplomatic restraint and crisis management, it has simultaneously moved to strengthen its own air defense capabilities even as it continues to depend on NATO.
Looking Ahead
How far Turkey-Israel relations will escalate depends not only on developments in Iran but also on the actions of surrounding actors, including Syria and the Gulf states. At least in the short term, however, it is more plausible to expect an expansion of indirect friction than an immediate direct war between the two countries. The main arenas in which this is likely to play out are places where their interests already intersect: Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa.
In Syria, the gap between the two sides remains especially wide with regard to the reorganization of the security order, the Kurdish issue, and the question of spheres of influence and demilitarization in southern Syria. In the Eastern Mediterranean, maritime boundary delimitation and the development and transportation of natural gas are likely to remain potential flashpoints. In the Horn of Africa, too, competition between the two sides may intensify through their respective involvement in Somalia, Somaliland, and the Red Sea shipping lanes. The immediate focus, therefore, should be less on the possibility of full-scale military conflict itself than on how rivalry in these surrounding regions may accumulate over time and deepen mutual distrust.
(Completed March 12, 2026)
