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• publication date:2026/02/17

What does its tourism policy change in Saudi Arabia?

MEIJ Commentary No.11

Kenichiro TAKAO,

Affiliated Research Fellow, MEIJ

 

 

“Change” for Saudi Arabia

God and emperor, spirit (mind) and flesh (body), the sacred and the profane. The dualistic mode of thinking long embedded in Western Christian societies tends to frame contemporary changes in Saudi Arabia through simplified binaries—such as the de-Islamization of an Islamic society, the liberalization of a conservative society, and the modernization of a medieval society. However, it is undeniable that since the launch of the economic master plan Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016, Saudi Arabia’s public image—long defined by oil and Islam as its twin pillars—has been undergoing a transformation. Through economic diversification and the relaxation of religious norms, descriptions of the country solely in terms of oil and Islam—although their presence remains significant in reality—has begun to feel outdated, at least among Saudis. In popular Japanese terms, such a narrative might be described as distinctly “Showa-era.”

Much of what is heard and seen regarding change in Saudi Arabia, as is well known, concerns the expansion of its entertainment industry and the advancement of women’s rights. Events featuring Japanese anime and the lifting of the ban on women driving are a few examples of topics that abound in Saudi Arabia today. These two areas have become the focal points of change for relatively straightforward reasons. Vision 2030 seeks economic diversification as well as increased foreign investment and domestic consumption in the pursuit of economic growth. Entertainment is expected to function as a sector that stimulates new investment and consumption, whereas women’s participation in society—facilitated by regulatory reforms—effectively incorporates half of the population into economic activity.

What is particularly important, however, is that in a country such as Saudi Arabia, these changes attract attention as challenges that go beyond mere economic policy. The transformations promoted under Vision 2030 represent an attempt to orient citizens toward values that serve the practical interests of the state, rather than those rooted primarily in Islam as the state religion. Borrowing Max Weber’s terminology, this may be understood as a shift from value-rational and traditional action to instrumental rational action—a shift capable of fundamentally reshaping patterns of thought and behavior among the population[1]. These changes are generally supported, especially by younger generations aged 30s and below, who constitute a majority of the population. That Saudi citizens—long criticized as conservative, closed, and exclusionary, as well as cautious toward change—have come to view change positively may be the most significant change of all.

 

The Development of Tourism Policy

Amid these waves of change, tourism policy has come to play a significant role in Saudi Arabia. In September 2019, the Kingdom began issuing tourist visas, a move widely reported by foreign media, including in Japan. Before discussing the implications, it is useful to briefly review the trajectory that led to this development.

From the 1950s, Saudi Arabia experienced a prolonged baby boom against the backdrop of national development driven by oil exports. By 1990, more than half of the population was under the age of 30, and the total fertility rate stood at approximately six, marking the country’s entry into a markedly youthful society. However, the labor market at the time—heavily dependent on public-sector employment and oil-related industries—was unable to absorb the rapidly growing number of young people. This situation exemplified what is often described as the “resource curse.”[2] Consequently, the Kingdom required new industries, and tourism was selected as one such sector.

Public institutions responsible for tourism were established sequentially from the 2000s onward. Beginning with the Supreme Commission for Tourism (SCT, 2000–2008), the organization was restructured and renamed the Saudi Commission for Tourism and Antiquities (SCTA, 2008–2015), followed by the Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage (SCTH, 2015–2020). In 2020, the Ministry of Tourism was established. These changes represented more than nominal rebranding; each reorganization was accompanied by developments that could be regarded as turning points. The transition to the SCTA, for instance, coincided with the inscription of Madaʾin Salih, an ancient Nabataean site in the Medina Province, as Saudi Arabia’s first UNESCO World Heritage Site (cultural heritage) in 2008. Reorganization into the SCTH followed the accession of King Salman in 2015 and anticipated the launch of Vision 2030 the following year. The establishment of the Ministry of Tourism came in the wake of the introduction of tourist visas in the preceding year. This institutional evolution clearly illustrates the process through which domestic archaeological sites came to be utilized as tourism resources; tourism itself was positioned as a means of reinforcingor even creatingnationalism, and tourism policy was elevated to a high-level issue administered at the ministerial level.

 

 

Photo 1: Tourism promotion event organized by the SCTA (Photo taken by the author in Riyadh on February 19, 2012)

 

The Reappraisal of Jahiliyya

Beginning with Madaʾin Salih, Saudi Arabia has seen a succession of sites inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. As of January 2026, eight sites have been identified (seven cultural sites and one natural site). Of these, only a limited number are readily accessible to the public, meaning that the World Heritage inscription has not immediately generated direct economic benefits for the tourism industry. However, in the Saudi context, such designations carry a significance that is distinct fromand arguably more important than—the economic impact alone.

First, these inscriptions have brought to light the civilizational richness of Saudi Arabia, which does not derive from continuity with major historical Islamic empires. In terms of civilizational history as a form of soft power, it is undeniable that Saudi Arabia has long lagged behind neighboring countries such as Iran, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey, all of which were centers of major Islamic dynasties.

Moreover, the fact that all inscribed World Heritage sites are unrelated to Islam carries another important implication for Saudi Arabia. Since the alliance formed in 1744 at Dirʿiyya between Muhammad ibn Saud, the founder of the House of Saud, and the Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, Saudi Arabia has upheld the formation of a society based on what it defines as “pure” Islam as a national principle. For a long time, this orientation has contributed to the poor compatibility between Islam and tourism within the Kingdom. The realization of “pure” Islam, as envisioned by this doctrine, depends on the exclusion of Islamic practices and cultural elements not grounded in the Qurʾan or the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad, which are dismissed as anti-Islamic bidʿa (reprehensible innovations). As a result, elements of Islamic culture that are easily commodified as tourism resources in neighboring countries—such as saint shrines imbued with popular religious practices that may be interpreted as personal veneration or even polytheistic, the rituals performed at these shrines, or richly decorated mosques that display the power and prestige of rulers—have been avoided in Saudi Arabia. Compared to other Middle Eastern countries that base their tourism industries on medieval Islamic dynasties and cultures, this may be described as a structural disadvantage of Saudi Arabia’s tourism policy.

Under these circumstances, pre-Islamic sites such as Madaʾin Salih constitute especially valuable resources for Saudi Arabia. They simultaneously serve as means of demonstrating the country’s civilizational depth while allowing the state to highlight this heritage without violating its national commitment to “pure” Islam. The development of these sites as tourism resources signifies a major shift in the excavation and reappraisal of Jahiliyya—the pre-Islamic period—which would traditionally have been regarded as an inferior or negative era. In recent years, Japanese archaeological research teams led by Kanazawa University have actively advanced their cooperation with Saudi Arabia[3]. From the Saudi perspective, however, this cooperation is not driven solely by academic interests.

As an aside, it is likely that few Japanese readers would immediately recognize the name Madaʾin Salih, referring to the ancient Nabataean site. However, eight years before the site was inscribed as a World Heritage property, a ruined city named “Madain Sari” appeared in Final Fantasy IX, a role-playing video game developed by the Japanese software company Square (now Square Enix). Given both the phonetic similarity and the shared motif of a fallen city, it is highly probable that the name was inspired by Madaʾin Salih. According to the author’s recollection, Madain Sari plays a pivotal role in the game’s narrative. Today, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Japan in content development within the game industry appears to be advancing under Vision 2030, and Madain Sari may perhaps be seen as an unexpected point of origin for such connections.

 

The Establishment of Founding Day (22 February 1727)

There is one more World Heritage site that is crucial to understanding contemporary change in Saudi Arabia: Dirʿiyya (the Turaif District), which was opened to the public in January 2022 following extensive restoration work. In conjunction with this opening, the Saudi government announced the establishment of a new national holiday, Founding Day (yaum al-taʾsis). As noted earlier, Dirʿiyya is the site where Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab concluded their alliance in 1744. It has long been regarded as the birthplace of Saudi Arabia, and this moment has traditionally been understood as the starting point of the First Saudi State (with the present Kingdom being considered the Third Saudi State). Founding Day, however, designates 1727rather than 1744as the beginning of Saudi Arabia.

The selection of this date was not without historical basis. February 22, 1727, marks the day on which Ibn Saud assumed the position of chief of Dirʿiyya. Nevertheless, the seemingly sudden establishment of this new commemorative day reveals several underlying intentions that are closely aligned with the Kingdom’s current transformation.

First, it serves to re-endow Dirʿiyya, already a World Heritage site, with renewed historical significance—which might also be described as added value as a tourism resource. More importantly, by defining 1727 as the founding year, Saudi Arabia will mark the tricentennial of its establishment in 2027. Had 1744 remained the point of origin, the 300th anniversary would not have arrived until 2044. In this sense, the tricentennial has effectively been preponed. For Vision 2030, which anticipates a major culmination within the next few years, the year 2027 can be seen as an aptly timed prelude or a celebratory overture.

It should be noted, however, that this issue is also affected by the question of whether anniversaries are calculated according to the Hijri or Gregorian calendar. The aforementioned 300 years are based on the Gregorian calendar. Even if calculated using the shorter Hijri calendar, a founding date of 1744 would place the tricentennial in 2035, which would still fall outside the symbolic framework of Vision 2030 and thus fail to serve as its prelude[4].

 

 

Photo 2: Advertisement celebrating Founding Day, bearing the slogan “Three centuries since we raised the flag” (Photo taken by the author in Riyadh on February 20, 2024)

 

What is even more noteworthy, however, is the extent to which the Islamic character has been attenuated in this new understanding of Saudi Arabia’s founding history. In addition to Founding Day, Saudi Arabia has observed two other non-religious national holidays: National Day (yaum al-watani), established in 2005, and Saudi Flag Day, established in 2023. What distinguishes Founding Day from these two holidays is its attempt to overwrite the conventional founding myth that traces the origin of the state to the politico-religious alliance of 1744—an alliance that sought to establish a society based on “pure” Islam and symbolically raised the flag under that banner. As a consequence, Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, one of the two parties to the alliance and the ideological foundation of the Saudi state, risks being pushed into the background of the national narrative. Thus, Founding Day may be understood as a phenomenon during which tourism policy, the formation of nationalism, and the reconfiguration of national history operate in tandem[5].

That said, in the conventional historiography of Saudi Arabia, February 22, 1727, is scarcely mentioned. A brief survey of introductory books on Saudi history published domestically shows that references to 1727 are found only in works issued after the establishment of Founding Day[6]. Moreover, even the National Museum in Riyadh—which might be expected to respond promptly to such a fundamental change—had, as of July 2025, no exhibits whatsoever presenting 1727 as the first year of Saudi history. This suggests that the establishment of Founding Day represents a sudden revision of historical interpretation and that even over three years later, surrounding institutions have yet to fully adapt to it.

 

Conclusion

That tourism policy can extend beyond economic policy to serve functions such as shaping the national political direction and reinforcing nationalism is by no means unique to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, the Kingdom’s tourism policy warrants particular attention because it is not merely a temporary instrument for fulfilling campaign promises or securing short-term political support under the current leadership. Rather, it contributes to the transformation of the image of the state as an Islamic society—an image that has long been articulated and embraced by Saudi Arabia as a source of pride. At the same time, as has already been emphasized, it would be premature to interpret these developments as de-Islamization. Put succinctly, the government seeks to reconcile what appear at first glance to be opposing trajectories—de-Islamization and Islamization—under the banner of “moderate Islam,” a slogan that is intended to encompass the rationalization of society.

That said, certain changes defy categorization, even under the rubric of Islamization. In 2024, Saudi Arabia opened its first liquor store in the Diplomatic Quarter of Riyadh. This marked the abandonment of one aspect of the “pure” Islamic society that had long been upheld through strict control over the sale and distribution of alcohol. As of July 2025, however, access to this store remains restricted to diplomats from non-Muslim-minority countries who are registered and carry identification, and sales to the general public are still prohibited. In effect, while maintaining the red line of not selling alcohol to Muslims, the state has nationalized a business targeting non-Muslims—a sector for which a certain level of consumption can be expected.

The series of transformations unfolding under Saudi Vision 2030, including tourism policy, may be evaluated as a form of neoliberalism insofar as they are grounded in market-oriented rationality, seek to mobilize younger generations as human capital, and celebrate individuals who seize the opportunities for “openness” granted by the state. In the Saudi case, however, the market does not ultimately obey laws, contracts, or notions of individual or public interest as much as it does political power. The government determines and directs the economic growth trajectory, leaving the market with little autonomy. The governing principle of the market is political loyalty; economic growth that lacks such loyalty is unlikely to be realized, just as regulatory relaxation that does not lead to it is unlikely to be pursued by the state. Such strong governmental intervention sits uneasily within the conventional understanding of neoliberalism. In other words, the future of tourism policy may serve as a lens through which both the present and future trajectory of the Saudi political system can be assessed.

 

 Photo 3: Exterior of a liquor store located in Riyadh’s Diplomatic Quarter; no signage is displayed (Photo taken by the author in Riyadh on July 16, 2025)

 

 

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