Research

• NEWCommentary
• publication date:2026/03/31

The Impact of the Gaza War on Jordan's Foreign Policy

MEIJ Commentary No.23 

Chie EZAKI,

National Defense Academy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of International Relations, Associate Professor

 

Introduction

Jordan has maintained stable governance amid the conflict-ridden Middle East. This characteristic has been highly valued by neighboring countries such as Israel, which saw Jordan as a buffer state between itself and Iraq, as well as by the U.S., a great power with deep ties to Israel. For the U.S., Jordan's stability was indispensable to Israel's security. Therefore, national stability was a crucial “selling point” for Jordan, and maintaining security could even be considered a key element of its external strategy.

However, when the second Trump administration took office in January 2025, this strategy began to show signs of strain. President Trump halted funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and attempted to shut down the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Notably, no country has relied more on these two agencies than Jordan.[1] One major consequence was the abrupt termination of millions of dollars in U.S. grants for Jordan’s largest seawater desalination project.

Interestingly, Washington restored aid to Jordan within two months of these decisions. This reversal was due not only to Jordan’s diplomatic efforts to assert its role as a pivotal Middle Eastern state with a robust financial foundation, but also to conclusion of the U.S. that Jordan's stability is crucial to its own security.[2]

Thus, it seems that Jordan's strategy has remained effective. In this context, how should the impact of the Gaza War be assessed? This study examines Jordan's foreign policy from this perspective.

 

Jordan's Basic Foreign Policy

Since King Hussein ascended the throne in 1953, Jordan has served as a buffer state bordering five countries: Israel to the west, Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia to the south, and Egypt to the southwest.[3] All of these countries possess greater military and economic power than Jordan, and there has been discord among the aforementioned Arab countries that shared hostility toward Israel. Consequently, Jordan has feared that participating in alliances with specific countries or with inter-state unions would compromise its independence.

From a national power perspective, when a smaller country seeks cooperation with a larger power, the latter may find the benefits insufficient due to the former's limited capabilities. Consequently, small countries that need alliances for their security may find themselves in situations where their own interests are trampled upon, yet they have no choice but to endure. Alternatively, if the larger power harbors territorial ambitions, there exists a risk of conquest. For such small countries, maintaining friendly relations with all states is likely to be the most effective way of guaranteeing security.

Jordan has placed great importance on building and maintaining friendly relations with countries in and outside the region.[4] For this reason, Jordan's diplomacy is described as omnidirectional or equidistance.

Nevertheless, Jordan has not been entirely spared from conflict. In such situations, its crucial role has been to help maintain an equal balance of power among disputing states, thereby avoiding circumstances in which it would be forced to take sides.

King Abdullah, who ascended the throne in 1999, appears to have inherited this spirit of omnidirectional diplomacy. Despite setbacks, Jordan has maintained friendly relations with its neighbors, including Gulf states, as well as with external powers, particularly Western countries.

 

Impact of the Gaza War Outbreak

However, during King Abdullah's reign, the Palestinian situation deteriorated steadily as peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine stalled in the early 2000s. Against this backdrop, Jordan became increasingly preoccupied with maintaining a balance among the relevant countries. This became more pronounced when the Gaza War erupted in October 2023. Faced with mounting domestic support for Palestine, the government had to consider national sentiment more in its foreign relations.

King Abdullah had historically been wary of Hamas expanding its political influence in Palestine. This caution stemmed from the presence of a political party in Jordan with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's predecessor organization. However, Jordan's stance toward Hamas was not solely hostile. It was also influenced by the perception that Hamas was defending the Palestinian cause, partly due to the significant presence of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin, or Palestinian Jordanians, in the country. Jordan has had no choice but to maintain a flexible stance, firmly rejecting any moves that could influence its domestic affairs—such as reopening Hamas offices within Jordan—while simultaneously maintaining a certain level of contact with Hamas.[5]

Following the Gaza War, support for Palestine increased among Jordanians, which heightened sympathy for Hamas. This brought about the following change: before the war, Hamas supporters in Jordan were predominantly Palestinian Jordanians who were mostly affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. After the war, support for Hamas began to spread among East Bank Jordanians, who are not of Palestinian origin.[6] They are a crucial support base for King Abdullah, who must heed their voices.

Against this backdrop, calls in Jordan to revoke the 1994 peace treaty with Israel grew louder. As of March 2026, Jordan still maintains the aforementioned treaty. The reason is to preserve its military and economic ties with the U.S., which Jordan views as vital to national security.[7]

However, there is also dissatisfaction that the second Trump administration is underestimating Jordan's role.[8] This may reflect Jordanians' candid impressions based on factors such as President Trump's proposal in February 2025 to “turn the Gaza Strip into the Riviera of the Middle East” and his stance toward Jordan at that time. This plan called for Jordan and Egypt to accept Gaza residents. President Trump expressed the view that Jordan would accept Palestinian refugees because the U.S. does so much for Jordan.

Regarding relations with the U.S. under President Trump, King Abdullah is seeking to avoid Jordan being perceived as hostile to the U.S., which could lead to political and economic consequences.[9] Therefore, while limiting its relationship with the “America First” President Trump to the bare minimum, Jordan also seeks to strengthen ties with European countries and move away from a situation of dependence solely on U.S. support.　

 

The Iran Factor

Although Jordan did not go as far as to revoke its peace treaty with Israel, it appears to be playing every card in its hand. One example was the recall of its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, along with its withdrawal from water-for-energy agreements with the UAE and Israel. In May 2024, the parliament passed a resolution to expel the Israeli ambassador to Jordan, signaling a “hardline stance” toward Israel.

In August 2024, a Jordanian truck driver killed an Israeli checkpoint officer at the Allenby Bridge, which connects Jordan and the West Bank.[10] As the Gaza War progressed, this incident was widely seen as an expression of the Jordanian public dissatisfaction with Israel.

However, this anti-Israeli sentiment has not undermined Jordan's stability. Why is that? In this regard, King Abdullah is likely benefited from heightened perception of the threat posed by Iran among Jordanians.[11]

Following the aforementioned killing of an Israeli citizen by a Jordanian truck driver, the Jordanians became concerned that Israel might view this incident as proof that Jordan is unable to implement counterterrorism measures, which could lead to a military intervention by Israel. This concern stems from armed groups linked to Iran beginning to smuggle drugs and weapons into Jordan in 2013. In other words, Jordanian public concern over Israeli military intervention was not solely triggered by recent incidents. Rather, it stems from the anxiety that Israel might view these incidents as evidence of Iran's expanding influence in Jordan and exploit it in ways that harm Jordan's interests and security.

In this context, Jordan's participation in intercepting ballistic missiles and drones launched from Iran toward Israel in mid-April 2024 is suggestive. Although Jordan insisted that the interception was solely for its own security, the action likely signaled to Israel that Iran poses a shared threat. Furthermore, while this action reportedly reignited domestic criticism of Jordan’s pro-Israel stance, it is also seen as having created a certain consensus among the public that the stability of the regime is crucial for supporting Gaza, and that Jordan will pursue this goal through diplomacy rather than military means.[12]

A public opinion poll released in August 2023, prior to the outbreak of the Gaza War, showed that Jordanians' perception of Iran as a threat had increased by 7.1 % since the previous survey conducted in 2021, reaching 19.1%.[13] The Gaza War heightened anti-Israel sentiment in Jordan and resulted in increased anti-Iran sentiment.

 

Conclusion

The Gaza War seems to have made Jordan more aware that maintaining stability is the best way to address threats from both Israel and Iran. Avoiding military engagements aligns with the spirit of Jordan’s omnidirectional diplomacy.

Israel and the U.S. had attacked against Iran late February 2026. Attention now turns to how Jordan will continue to implement its foreign policy, which is based on maintaining its own stability.

＜ Previous Page | ↑ | Next Page ＞