2023 Research and Study
- NEWCommentary
- publication date:2026/03/31
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective（10）” Who Is Mojtaba Khamenei, the Third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic?
MEIJ Commentary No. 21
[Surveying the Situation in Iran: From a Middle East?Eurasia Perspective (10)]
Following the attack on Iran by the United States and Israel on February 28, 2026, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes, tensions in the Middle East have intensified. In light of these developments, this series of commentaries, titled “Surveying the Situation in Iran: From a Middle East?Eurasia Perspective,” presents analyses by members of the research group, drawing on their respective regional and disciplinary specialties to examine the background of the current situation and its implications.
“Who Is Mojtaba Khamenei, the Third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic?”
Masamichi Saito
Senior Research Fellow, Middle East Institute of Japan
On March 9, 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei was selected as the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The selection was made by the Assembly of Experts, composed of 88 Islamic jurists, requiring a two-thirds majority vote. In a statement, the Assembly announced that Mojtaba had been chosen by an “overwhelming majority.” However, it remains unclear where and how the meeting was held, whether there were any candidates other than Mojtaba, and what arguments were made for or against his selection.
After Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in an Israeli?U.S. bombing on February 28, his duties were temporarily assumed by an interim leadership council consisting of three members: President Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Mohseni-Ejei, and Alafi, a jurist of the Guardian Council. Following Mojtaba’s selection as Supreme Leader, Guardian Council spokesperson Tahan-Nazif announced the termination of the council’s activities.
Who Is Mojtaba Khamenei?
Mojtaba Khamenei is the second son of Ali Khamenei and was born on September 8, 1969, making him 56 years old. In addition to Mojtaba, Ali Khamenei had six children: his eldest son Mostafa (born 1965/66), third son Masoud (born 1972/73), fourth son Meysam (born 1977/78), eldest daughter Bashari (born 1980/81), and second daughter Hoda (born 1981/82). Mojtaba and his three brothers are Islamic clerics, although none appear frequently in public.
Like his father, Mojtaba was born in Mashhad but later moved to Tehran, where he graduated from Alavi High School. At age 17 (1986/87), he participated in the Iran?Iraq War and served in the “Habib ibn Mazaher” battalion. During this time, he reportedly became acquainted with individuals who would later hold important positions in Iran’s security apparatus, including Hossein Taeb, who subsequently headed the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In the Iranian year 1378 (1999/2000), at age 30, Mojtaba reportedly moved to the religious city of Qom to study Islamic jurisprudence under figures such as Mesbah Yazdi. It is not known what he did between graduating from high school and reaching the age of 30, but he apparently did not attend a seminary until then. His relatively late entry into formal religious study raises questions about his scholarly depth.
In the same year, he married Zahra, the daughter of former parliament speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel (which might also be considered a relatively late marriage given the traditional religious background of the Khamenei family). Notably, another daughter of Haddad-Adel previously lived in Japan with her husband, who studied at Kanazawa University, before spending three years at a university in the United States. Mojtaba and Zahra are said to have three children?two sons and one daughter?although there have been unverified claims that they visited London with bodyguards for fertility treatment. Zahra’s father strongly denied these reports.
Unlike his brothers, Mojtaba has been involved behind the scenes in managing the Office of the Supreme Leader. He has never held an official public position. He became widely known in 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the presidential election; Mehdi Karroubi, another candidate and former parliament speaker, accused Mojtaba of interfering in the electoral process. Mojtaba is also said to wield significant influence over Iran’s state broadcasting organization. Mohammad Sarafraz, a former head of the organization (dismissed only a year and a half after assuming the post), wrote in his memoirs that Mojtaba had been involved in fabricating scandals to discredit political rivals.
There have also been reports that Mojtaba possesses vast assets?including hotels?in Europe and Dubai. According to Bloomberg, Iranian businessman Ali Ansari, who initiated the “Iran Mall” development project, is said to hold these assets as Mojtaba’s proxy. Ansari is believed to have financially supported the IRGC and has been sanctioned by the United Kingdom, although he strongly denies any connection with Mojtaba.
Expectations and Concerns Regarding Supreme Leader Mojtaba
Mojtaba began to be mentioned as a potential successor to Ali Khamenei in the 2010s, but the Supreme Leader never publicly referred to passing the position to his son. According to a March 9, 2026, report by Amwaj.media, sources claim that a note left by Khamenei before his death stated his opposition to such a succession. The Guardian also reported on March 11 that Iran’s ambassador to Cyprus testified that Khamenei opposed his son’s succession. If this is true, it may have been born out of concern that hereditary succession would transform the Islamic Republic?born from the 1979 revolution?into something other than a “republic.”
The same report suggested that figures such as Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who was allegedly trusted by Khamenei to manage state affairs, and Ali Asghar Hejazi, Deputy Chief of the Supreme Leader’s Office also opposed Mojtaba’s selection. Nevertheless, Hossein Taeb, former head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization and a close associate of Mojtaba, reportedly strongly pushed for his appointment.
Although these reports remain unverified, Mojtaba’s close ties to the IRGC?particularly its intelligence branch?have long been pointed out. Despite never holding senior government positions such as president, cabinet minister, or military commander, he has been regarded as a leading candidate for the position of Supreme Leader because the IRGC views him as likely to maintain the existing network of economic and political interests built around his father. In this sense, Mojtaba can be regarded as an ultra-conservative figure whose primary concern is preserving the status quo.
At the same time, some individuals express hope that Mojtaba could act as a “reformer” capable of eliminating Iran’s entrenched corruption. For example, Parviz Parizdar, who became known for exposing allegations of financial corruption against powerful clerics within the regime, said in a November 2024 interview that “if Ayatollah Mojtaba becomes the next Supreme Leader, the fight against corruption may finally be pursued seriously.” He added that Mojtaba possesses the determination necessary to confront corruption. Faezeh Hashemi, daughter of the late former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and occasional critic of the Islamic Republic, similarly described Mojtaba as “Iran’s bin Salman,” suggesting that he might bring transformative change to Iran in the way Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has done in Saudi Arabia.
However, there are virtually no clues regarding Mojtaba’s political orientation or intellectual outlook. He has rarely appeared in public and has never conducted media interviews, delivered speeches, or published scholarly articles. The more important question may therefore be how real power holders in Iran will present him to domestic and international audiences, how they will stage-manage him, and what kinds of statements and actions they will have him perform. In fact, a process of “myth-making” has already begun. On March 9, the day his selection as Supreme Leader was announced, Iranian state television portrayed him as being fluent in Arabic and English, educated in psychology, and knowledgeable in technology, military science, security affairs, and political issues.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf described him as “pious, revolutionary, close to the people, courageous, capable, and administratively competent,” as well as “in tune with the times and well aware of the enemy.” He also praised him as someone who lives modestly, understands the country’s current circumstances and problems, and is innovative, particularly in recognizing the importance of knowledge-based industries. Notably, both Ghalibaf’s statement and media portrayals emphasize his modernity rather than his credentials as an Islamic jurist.
It should also be noted that reports in late August 2022 indicated that Mojtaba had begun registering participants for an advanced Islamic jurisprudence course (dars-e kharej), likely to bolster his religious authority as a jurist. However, in September 2024, he announced that the course would be temporarily suspended, suggesting that he might not have been particularly eager to position himself as a leading Islamic jurist.
When Iranian state television announced Mojtaba’s selection as the third Supreme Leader on March 9, the broadcaster reportedly referred to him as a “wounded veteran of the Ramadan War,” referring to the war between Iran and Israel?U.S. that began on February 28. According to a report by The Guardian on March 11, Iran’s ambassador to Cyprus stated that Mojtaba sustained injuries to his leg and arm and was not in a condition to deliver a speech. After the Israel?U.S. attacks on Iran, the survival of leaders such as President Pezeshkian was confirmed through video messages. However, Mojtaba has not issued any video, audio, or even written statements since being selected as Supreme Leader, raising concerns about the severity of his condition.
It is also possible that, under the pretext of avoiding assassination attempts by the United States or Israel, messages from Supreme Leader Mojtaba will henceforth be conveyed only through the IRGC. In such circumstances, powerful figures within the regime?including senior IRGC officers?could become the sole “intermediaries” or “gatekeepers” connecting others to the Supreme Leader, effectively “producing” his messages and potentially appropriating the authority of the Supreme Leader himself.
(Date of completion: March 12, 2026)
