2023 Research and Study
- Commentary
- publication date:2026/03/31
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective（4）” China's Shock and Calculations Related to the U.S. Attack on Iran
MEIJ Commentary No.15
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective （4）”
Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes, tensions in the Middle East have escalated further. In response to these developments, this commentary series, titled Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective, brings together analyses by members of the study group, each examining the current situation from the standpoint of their own regional and disciplinary expertise, while considering its background and implications.
China's Shock and Calculations Related to the U.S. Attack on Iran
Emi MIFUNE,
Professor Emi Mifune, Faculty of Law, Komazawa University
In under eight weeks, China lost two stalwart “anti-U.S.” partners that are heavily dependent on Beijing. Following the January 3 capture of Nicolás Maduro by U.S. Special Forces, an airstrike operation conducted jointly on February 28 by the United States and Israel claimed the life of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In March 2021, China and Iran signed a comprehensive agreement to deepen cooperation in fields such as the economy and security over a 25-year period. However, since the February 28 attack, China, although verbally “supporting” Iran's sovereignty, has maintained a cautious stance in relation to the provision of effective “support” in security matters.
What is the Chinese view of the United States’ “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran? Furthermore, what effects can this military operation be expected to have on China?
China’s “Consideration” of a U.S. Presidential Visit Despite Strong Criticism of “Sovereignty Infringement”
Regarding the situation in Iran since February 28, Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated during the National People's Congress on March 8 that “this war should never have happened and benefits no country,” criticizing attempts to instigate Color Revolutions and regime change. Wang also outlined his “five fundamental principles to uphold in Iran and the Middle East”: (1) Respect for national sovereignty; (2) Prohibition of the abuse of force; (3) Adherence to non-interference in internal affairs; (4) Commitment to a political solution; and (5) The constructive role of major powers.
However, in his Government Work Report at the opening of the NPC on March 5, Premier Li Qiang skipped over the pre-distributed wording stating that China “opposes hegemony and power politics, and opposes all forms of unilateralism and protectionism.” This impromptu editing of the contents apparently reflected a certain level of diplomatic deference ahead of the visit by U.S. President Donald Trump to China scheduled for March 31 through April 2.
Then what should Saudi Arabia do?
For the United States, which seeks to advance its encirclement of Iran, Saudi Arabia's choice to incorporate Iran based on regional logic was troublesome. This likely influenced Iran's hardline stance during the Gaza War. In this regard, Iran's decision to attack Saudi Arabia can be considered an extremely welcome development for the United States.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia harbors deep-seated distrust toward U.S. Middle East policy. While weakening the threat posed by Iran's hard power—its nuclear program, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and “Axis of Resistance” factions—would be desirable, destabilizing Iran and thereby destabilizing the region would carry serious risks. The strategic advantages of forcing Iran's submission without hedging these risks may exist for the United States and Israel, but not for Saudi Arabia.
That said, Saudi Arabia lacks the unwavering resolve or decisive power to force a shift in U.S. policy toward Iran. Since the war began on February 28, Saudi Arabia has viewed the U.S.–Israeli attacks on Iran as semi-irreversible, while continuously issuing messages aimed at minimizing spillover effects. On March 9, through a Foreign Ministry statement, Saudi Arabia issued a strong warning that if tensions continued, Iran would suffer devastating blows.
Sanctioned Crude Oil and the UAE's Hub Function
In recent years, China has purchased more than 80% of Iran's exported crude oil. This amount constitutes approximately 13% of China's seaborne imports, but the “actual import volume” is widely believed to be higher. This discrepancy exists because, to evade Western sanctions, the oil is transferred at sea and is relabeled as originating from Malaysia or other nations. By 2025, about 30% of China's annual crude oil imports were sourced from sanctioned countries. In just two months, China lost access to two sources of crude oil priced well below international market levels. Furthermore, about 40% of China's crude oil imports in 2025 came from Middle Eastern Gulf countries; 56% of China’s total crude oil imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz.
The effects on China deriving from the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz extend beyond its energy security. The UAE's major ports also function as important hubs for the Belt and Road Initiative. As part of the Green Maritime Corridor International Cooperation Initiative announced by China in October 2025, Jebel Ali Port in Dubai is slated to establish such a corridor.
Military conflict in the Middle East is therefore delivering a significant blow to China's economic security.
Overwhelming Military Power Demonstrated by the United States to China
The targeting of this overwhelming U.S. military operation carries implications extending beyond Iran itself. China is likely aware that these actions serve as a warning to the other “CRINK” members: China, Russia, and North Korea.
During both the January Venezuela and February Iran airstrike operations, U.S. EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft played a crucially important role by jamming and suppressing radar and communications. Iran's HQ9B missiles, YLC8B radars, and the Beidou satellite positioning system, which are all China-supported air defense systems, were exposed as highly vulnerable to U.S. electronic systems and countermeasures.
Furthermore, on March 4 in international waters off the southern coast of Sri Lanka, an Iranian naval vessel returning from the multinational exercise “MILAN 2026” hosted by the Indian navy was sunk by a torpedo from a U.S. submarine. The event demonstrated to the world that the geographic scope of the conflict is no longer confined to the Persian Gulf region. China likely interpreted the sinking as a message intended for both China and India.
Chinese Calculations about the Situation in Iran
The situation in Iran has shocked China, but it has also created potential strategic opportunities.
U.S. military resources are being drawn back into the Middle East, potentially weakening the stance of U.S. military deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Expending valuable interceptor missiles against Iran could strain the U.S. military defense budget. Should forces in the Middle East become bogged down, China might be emboldened to pursue its geopolitical objectives in Asia with less resistance.
The attack on Iran by the United States and Israel presents excellent opportunities for China to gather “real-world combat data” from the air defense radar and drone technologies it earlier supplied to Iran. By analyzing the jamming and spoofing tactics employed by the U.S. military against Iran and Venezuela, China can optimize its military systems and strengthen its preparedness for a potential future U.S.–China conflict.
Moreover, continued conflict with Iran could intensify Chinese control over vitally important minerals such as rare earth elements including neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium for drone motors, samarium for missile guidance systems, germanium for infrared sensors, and gallium for radar. This heightened degree of control might increase Beijing's powerful diplomatic leverage against the United States.
(Completed March 8, 2026)
