2023 Research and Study
- NEWCommentary
- publication date:2026/03/31
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective（5）” Where does Saudi Arabia stand, and what is it looking at?
MEIJ Commentary No.16
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective （5）”
Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes, tensions in the Middle East have escalated further. In response to these developments, this commentary series, titled Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective, brings together analyses by members of the study group, each examining the current situation from the standpoint of their own regional and disciplinary expertise, while considering its background and implications.
Where does Saudi Arabia stand, and what is it looking at?
Kenichiro TAKAO,
Middle East Institute of Japan, Affiliate Research Fellow
For Saudi Arabia, which seeks economic growth not only by increasing revenues through traditional oil exports, but also through investment and tourism, and further aims to boost domestic consumption through the expansion of entertainment industries, stability in the Middle East and peaceful domestic conditions are indispensable. As part of this strategy, Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations with Iran in March 2023, choosing engagement rather than continued confrontation of the country. Following this approach, even as the Gaza War began in October 2023, and Israel and the United States portrayed Iran as a regional threat, Saudi Arabia continued its diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran's isolation in the region. This position now appears to have reached a critical juncture because of the current U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran. From what perspective is Saudi Arabia viewing the current situation?
Following an attack by Iran
In response to Iran's retaliatory attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia issued a strongly worded condemnation. A similar statement was issued in June 2025 following Iran's attack on a U.S. military base in Qatar, although this was essentially boilerplate, criticizing violations of other nations' sovereignty and territory as well as breaches of international law. In fact, the statement even contained criticism of Israel and the United States for pushing Iran into a corner, thereby exposing Gulf nations to collateral danger. By contrast, the latest statement differs in nature; it makes no reference to Iran's circumstances, meaning it solely criticizes Iran.
Despite this, Iran carried out attacks targeting Saudi Arabia on March 2, damaging the Ras Tanura refinery near Dammam in the Eastern Province. On March 3, the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh’s diplomatic quarter was attacked by drones. Following these events, the Saudi government confirmed in a cabinet meeting that same day that it would “respond” to the Iranian threat.
Then what should Saudi Arabia do?
For the United States, which seeks to advance its encirclement of Iran, Saudi Arabia's choice to incorporate Iran based on regional logic was troublesome. This likely influenced Iran's hardline stance during the Gaza War. In this regard, Iran's decision to attack Saudi Arabia can be considered an extremely welcome development for the United States.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia harbors deep-seated distrust toward U.S. Middle East policy. While weakening the threat posed by Iran's hard power—its nuclear program, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and “Axis of Resistance” factions—would be desirable, destabilizing Iran and thereby destabilizing the region would carry serious risks. The strategic advantages of forcing Iran's submission without hedging these risks may exist for the United States and Israel, but not for Saudi Arabia.
That said, Saudi Arabia lacks the unwavering resolve or decisive power to force a shift in U.S. policy toward Iran. Since the war began on February 28, Saudi Arabia has viewed the U.S.–Israeli attacks on Iran as semi-irreversible, while continuously issuing messages aimed at minimizing spillover effects. On March 9, through a Foreign Ministry statement, Saudi Arabia issued a strong warning that if tensions continued, Iran would suffer devastating blows.
The Iran situation for the Saudi regime
As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about the spillover effects of the conflict. The impact on the oil market, as well as potential human and material losses, have limited consequences for the regime. What matters is the political embarrassment of being unable to influence regional affairs and the stigma of being complicit in the regional order reshuffle desired by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu. Such an outcome could cast a shadow over the reign of the current King Salman and on the political career of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, widely expected to become the next king. For Crown Prince Mohammed especially, whose reign could potentially become one of the longest in Saudi history, beginning his rule under such circumstances would carry long-term political consequences. Saudi regime, ideally, does not possess the means to engage in the achievement-building that leaders from democratic nations, who hold power for only a few years, might engage in.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s response to the Iranian situation is limited to two options. Either it rapidly constructs a narrative justifying a future in which the Iranian regime collapses, supporting or tacitly accepting a U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran. Or it intercepts attacks from Iran while playing a mediating role in pacifying the latter, even if this requires patience and sacrifice consistent with Saudi Arabia's traditional diplomatic approach. As previously noted, Saudi Arabia currently leans toward the latter position. However, this largely stems from its lack of trust in the United States. In other words, its stance is far from solid. As the situation evolves at a rapid pace, Saudi Arabia must look ahead.
(Completed at 3:00 PM Japan Standard Time on March 9, 2026)
