2023 Research and Study
- NEWCommentary
- publication date:2026/03/23
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective (2)” Decoding the Iran Attack: Background and Outlook
MEIJ Commentary No.13
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective (2)”
Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes, tensions in the Middle East have escalated further. In response to these developments, this commentary series, titled Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective, brings together analyses by members of the study group, each examining the current situation from the standpoint of their own regional and disciplinary expertise, while considering its background and implications.
Decoding the Iran Attack: Background and Outlook
Masaki MIZOBUCHI,
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Meijigakuin University
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale attack on Iran, and during which Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was reportedly killed. This immediately shifted international attention from the fate of nuclear negotiations to crisis management. The Trump administration appeared to have no clear casus belli, victory conditions, or exit strategy prepared, and made little effort to convince the American public of the war's legitimacy or necessity. President Trump's core supporters are extremely wary of a repeat of the Iraq War, and support for a large-scale attack on Iran therefore remains limited.
While the ultimate duration and intensity of the attacks remain unknown, the conflict has already spread across the entire Persian Gulf region, impacting the international economy and increasing oil prices. This military action is unlikely to be merely a temporary clash; rather, it is likely to produce long-term implications for the future of the Middle Eastern regional order and the nuclear management regime.
The Twists and Turns of U.S.–Iran Relations and the “Third Party”
The United States and Iran have positioned each other as “sworn enemies” since the 1979 revolution, yet they have sought limited cooperation and negotiated deals on a case-by-case basis. The nuclear issue has followed a similar pattern, with sanctions and negotiations alternating since the discovery of undeclared facilities in 2002. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), established under the Obama administration in 2015, was a landmark agreement designed to manage the crisis through limits on uranium enrichment and stockpiles combined with strengthened verification. However, the first Trump administration declared its unilateral withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions. Iran responded by expanding enrichment and supporting regional (anti-American, anti-Israeli) armed groups (for details on Iran's support for armed groups and the “Axis of Resistance,” see Chapter 6 of my book, What is America's Middle East Strategy?).
Crucial here is the presence of Israel, a close U.S. ally (for details on why the U.S. excessively favors Israel, see Chapter 3 of the aforementioned book). For Iran's current regime, confrontation with Israel (and opposition to the “Western imperialism and colonialism” the latter embodies), along with its dedication to the Palestinian cause, form the ideological backbone supporting the regime's legitimacy. Nuclear weapons, missiles, and support for regional armed groups are the core of Iran’s deterrence strategy against Israel.
Conversely, the perception of threat from a nuclear-armed Iran is far stronger in geographically proximate Israel than in the United States. Israel's fierce opposition to the JCPOA reflected its belief that the agreement, by lifting sanctions without permanently dismantling Iran's nuclear capabilities or restricting its missile program and support for regional armed groups, could ultimately strengthen its encirclement of Israel.
Thus, U.S.–Iran relations must therefore be understood not merely as a bilateral relationship but as a tripartite dynamic involving Israel.
Whenever nuclear negotiations appeared likely to advance in a direction favorable to Iran, Israel frequently lobbied the U.S. Congress and mobilized public opinion to block them, driven by its perception of security threats. By contrast, the United States has, in many instances, been far more wary of being drawn into Israel's (often unilateral) military actions against Iran than of a nuclear-armed Iran itself.
This crisis must likewise be interpreted within this triangular strategic relationship.
Why Did the Nuclear Talks Fail?
The Trump administration struck Iran's nuclear and missile facilities in June 2025 (the so-called “Twelve-Day War”), but the operation failed to produce a decisive resolution. Subsequently, in the indirect negotiations that resumed in Geneva in February 2026, the United States demanded comprehensive concessions centered on halting enrichment activities (“zero enrichment”), extending to ballistic missiles and support for regional armed groups. Conversely, Iran insisted that peaceful uranium enrichment constituted an “inalienable right” under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintained that missiles, as a core element of deterrence, were not open to negotiation. This represented a fundamental divide.
Furthermore, domestic factors in Iran have hindered the progress of these talks. The protests that erupted in late 2025 and the subsequent harsh crackdown by security forces left deep scars on both the regime's legitimacy and its governance capacity. While President Pezeshkian spoke of the need to heal societal fractures, concerns that compromise would weaken the regime instead pushed the leadership toward tightening political control in order to preserve the Islamic system. At the same time, President Trump's repeated references to potential regime change further reinforced the regime's belief that it could not relinquish its nuclear and missile capabilities or regional armed forces as deterrents.
Beyond Iran and the United States, Israel's role as a third actor significantly influenced the trajectory of negotiations. Since its June attack last year, Israel had strongly urged President Trump to deliver a decisive blow (potentially leading to regime change) against the weakened Iranian regime, expressing concern that negotiations might hinder its attack plans. Meanwhile, President Trump himself appears to have been emboldened by the success of the U.S. operation in Venezuela in January 2026.
Thus, the respective bargaining ranges of the United States, Iran, and Israel failed to converge until the end. The negotiations reached an impasse, and ultimately, pushed by Israel, the United States and Israel launched a joint attack on Iran on February 28.
Geopolitical and Nuclear Risks Following an Attack
The February 28 attack was not merely a limited operation targeting only nuclear facilities but a large-scale operation that included the killing of the leadership and military command (“decapitation strike”). However, while “decapitation” may disrupt decision-making in the short term, achieving regime change alone is nearly impossible. Rather, external attacks risk reinforcing the “victim” narrative, stirring anti-American sentiment and (at least short-term) social cohesion, thereby bolstering the logic of hardline anti-American factions. A scenario where the military-led regime, centered on the Revolutionary Guard Corps, becomes even more powerful therefore remains plausible.
Furthermore, even if airstrikes damaged some facilities, it would be impossible to completely neutralize Iran's nuclear capabilities. Core elementssuch as knowledge, personnel, and dispersed infrastructurecould remain intact. In addition, war would severely weaken the international nuclear inspection regime. If inspectors cannot move freely or communicate safely, significant gaps could emerge in the management and monitoring of nuclear materials. Moreover, if the balance of power among religious authorities, the government, and the Revolutionary Guard become unstable, the unity of the negotiating entity would be compromised, blurring control over nuclear assets and decision-making authority.
Given these factors, post-attack geopolitical and nuclear risk assessments should focus not on the operational success rate but on rebuilding frameworks for resuming negotiations and restoring nuclear material management and inspection systems.
(Written in March 5, 2026)
