2023 Research and Study
- NEWCommentary
- publication date:2026/03/23
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective 1” How did the war change relations between Iran and the Gulf states?
MEIJ Commentary No.12
“Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective (1)”
Following the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes, tensions in the Middle East have escalated further. In response to these developments, this commentary series, titled Surveying the Situation in Iran: A Middle East–Eurasia Perspective, brings together analyses by members of the study group, each examining the current situation from the standpoint of their own regional and disciplinary expertise, while considering its background and implications.
How did the war change relations between Iran and the Gulf states?
Hisae NAKANISHI,
Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University
Introduction
On February 28, 2026, Israel and the United States launched attacks against Iran. Just two days earlier, Iran and the United States had been engaged in nuclear negotiations in Geneva, with Oman serving as mediator. Amid speculation that negotiations would likely be postponed until the following week, Omani Foreign Minister Badr visited the United States on February 27 and met with U.S. Vice President Vance. He stated, “Iran has indicated its intention to abandon its stockpile of highly enriched uranium” (Kyodo News, February 28, 2026). I thought, “Did Iran compromise this much? This is unprecedented.” However, the war started the very next day. Once again, the outbreak of war undermined the diplomatic efforts made by both Iran and Oman. Similar to the outbreak of the 12 Day War in June 2025, this attack also occurred during nuclear negotiations.
The Israeli and American attacks on Iran are a clear violation of international law. Moreover, the assassination of seven senior leaders, including the Supreme Leader Khamenei, constitutes an unwarranted violation of sovereignty. Consequently, Iran's retaliatory strikes rapidly expanded beyond Israel to Gulf states by the third day of the war (Nikkei, March 4, 2026). However, it is hard to deny that Iran’s reactions will cast a shadow on Iran’s relationship with the Gulf states.
Iran's Policy Toward Gulf States: “Tension-Easing” Diplomacy Under the Previous Raisi Administration
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in May 1981 by six Gulf states to prevent Iran from exporting its revolutionary ideology, following the Iranian Revolution. The objective of its foundation was to construct a regional security cooperation framework, as the GCC stated at the time of its establishment. Yet, its actual aim was to counter Iran. As a matter of fact, after the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, one of the most influential GCC members, became increasingly hostile. Iran's influence within the so-called “Axis of Resistance” network and the struggle for regional hegemony that Saudi Arabia challenged made the relationship of these countries highly tense.
Meanwhile, some changes also emerged within the GCC member states. Qatar and Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic ties in 2017 but restored them in 2021. Regarding their relations with Israel, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed peace agreements (the Abraham Accords) with Israel in 2021, while Saudi Arabia did not sign. Furthermore, in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized diplomatic relations through China’s mediation.
Oman is rather exceptional as it has not hosted any permanent U.S. military bases. Therefore, it has mediated nuclear negotiations between Iran and its negotiation team (five permanent states and Germany) since 2013. Thus, the relationships between Iran and the GCC states exhibited varying degrees of closeness and tension. On the other hand, from the start of the Gaza War on October 7, 2023, until 2024, the GCC did not exhibit any “anti-Iran” attitude. Accordingly, Iran also eased its relationship with its neighboring states, particularly since the Raisi administration (2021–2025). However, Israel and Iran had a direct military confrontation in 2024, which was historically the first time. Moreover, the 12-Day War of 2025 between Israel, the US, and Iran occurred, but Israel and Iran maintained their attacks and retaliations in a restrictive manner. Meanwhile, the Gulf states, while implicitly criticizing Israeli attacks on Iran after the 12-Day War, adopted a cautious stance toward Iran to avoid being drawn into the hostilities.
Right before the end of the 12-Day War, Iran launched a limited attack on a U.S. military base in Qatar. This prompted Qatar and other GCC countries to condemn Iran. Contrary to Iran’s détente policy, relations between Iran and the GCC nations became strained.
Israel and the U.S. attacks on Iran, starting February 28, and the Gulf States
On February 28, Israel and the United States launched attacks on Iran, as described earlier. However, as early as March 2, Saudi Arabia suffered drone attacks from Iran, forcing the shutdown of its major oil refinery, Saudi Aramco Ras Tanura. Saudi Arabia also faced attacks from Iran, while the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and the Eastern Province received Iran’s attacks. On March 4, Saudi Arabia condemned Iran's blatant aggression (Arab News, March 4, 2026). On March 2, Qatar also halted LNG production after its LNG export facility, which is the world’s largest, was attacked by Iranian drones. Iran issued a statement threatening to set fire to ships and tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, effectively rendering it impassable. If Gulf nations' oil and natural gas revenues continue to decline due to a prolonged war, relations between the Gulf states and Iran will deteriorate further.
Furthermore, Iran attacked both Doha International Airport in Qatar and Dubai International Airport in the UAE, leading to temporary closures. As of March 5, Doha Airport partially resumed operations, but both airports showed reduced functionality as hub airports. EuroNews (March 5, 2026) projected that tourism revenues of the Gulf nations, primarily the UAE and Qatar, would decrease by 29 billion to 48 billion euros annually.
Conclusion
On March 4, Iranian President Pezeshkian posted on X: “Security and stability in the Midd
le East region require joint action by neighboring countries and Iran's friendly nations.” Iran appears to expect that these countries would pressure the United States to halt its attacks on Iran if Iran attacks U.S. military bases or critical infrastructure in Gulf states. Yet, Iran's options seem to be limited, faced by Israel’s and the US overwhelming military powers. Iran’s attacks on the Gulf states are a matter of its limited choices. However, there is a risk that such actions would fuel the Gulf states' hostility toward Iran, potentially leading to Iran’s further isolation. This is because the Gulf states would perceive Iran as a major threat, both militarily and economically. It is reported that Iran may select the conservative hardliner Mojtaba Khamenei (the second son of the late Supreme Leader Khamenei) as the successor to him (Reuters, March 5, 2026). If that happens, a perception of “Iranian threat” will become stronger, and will be shared not only by Israel and the United States but also by the Gulf states. Iran's retaliation against the Gulf states has left a deep scar on their relationship. There is a risk of war that would spill over to the wider Middle East.
(Written in March 5, 2026)
References
Aoki, Kenta. “The Global South in Iran's Foreign Policy: Transformation of the International Order and Iran's Multilateral Diplomacy.” Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 3 (549), January 2024.
Nakanishi, Hisae, “Chapter 10: Iran's Nuclear Development and Governance,” Hiroshima City University Hiroshima Peace Research Institute (ed.), Peace and Governance in Asia II, Yushindo, March 2025.
Takao, Kenichiro, “Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia's Blueprint for a Middle Eastern Regional Order,” and Hisae Nakanishi, “Chapter 8: The Eurasian Transport Corridor Initiative and Iran—Seeking Expanded Connectivity,” in Kenta Aoki, Ryohei Kasai, and Middle East Research Institute (eds.), Reading the World from the Middle East and Eurasia, Iwanami Shoten, December 2025
