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• publication date:2026/04/01

The Iran Crisis and the Kurdish Question: Turkey’s Response and Challenges

MEIJ Commentary No.25 

Mayu KANEKO,

Senior Research Fellow, Middle East Institute of Japan 

 

1. Turkey’s Position on the Iran Crisis

The crisis triggered by the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, 2026, has increasingly taken on the character of a region-wide confrontation, as Iran launched retaliatory attacks against U.S.-related military facilities as well as energy and infrastructure sites in the Gulf states. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has been severely constrained, and on March 18 LNG-related facilities at Ras Laffan in Qatar were also damaged. As a result, concerns now extend beyond crude oil and natural gas to a wide range of supply chains involving petrochemicals, fertilizers, sulfur, helium, and other commodities.[1] The issue is no longer confined to the Middle East; it has escalated into a complex crisis with the potential to shake the global economy. For Turkey, one of the most serious additional concerns is the Kurdish question. If instability inside Iran spreads into Kurdish-populated areas in western Iran, it could directly affect Turkey’s security through border instability and increased activity by cross-border armed groups.[2]

Against this backdrop, Turkey has condemned the U.S.-Israeli attack while also making clear that it considers Iranian retaliation against third countries unacceptable. It has called on both sides to halt their attacks immediately and pursue a diplomatic solution. The Turkish government has also stated that it will neither participate in the war nor allow itself to be drawn into the conflict as one of its parties[3] In other words, Turkey is seeking to avoid siding militarily with either the United States and Israel or Iran, while at the same time preserving room for mediation.[4]

 From the early stages of the crisis, Turkey tried to keep open the possibility of continued dialogue between the United States and Iran. At the same time, in March 2026, ballistic missiles believed to have been launched from Iran flew toward Turkey on three separate occasions, prompting interception by NATO air defense systems.[5] Turkey responded by lodging a strong protest with Iran, while NATO reinforced its air defense posture around Incirlik Air Base in the south-central province of Adana and the radar facility in Malatya Province. Iran, however, denied having targeted Turkey. The two sides therefore continue to differ in their account of what happened.[6] Even so, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has maintained that Turkey’s highest priority is to avoid reacting to provocations, avoid joining the war, and preserve its position as a third party.

That said, it would be misleading to characterize Turkey’s position as mere “neutrality.” While non-participation in military action against Iran remains an explicit red line, Ankara has also indicated that it will take whatever measures it deems necessary if its border security or counterterrorism posture is threatened. Turkey’s basic approach, therefore, is best understood as a cautious yet realistic strategy of avoiding direct involvement in the war while refusing to allow the crisis to undermine its own security environment.

On March 25, reports emerged that U.S.-Iran talks aimed at a ceasefire might resume, with Turkey mentioned as a possible venue.[7] Whether direct negotiations will actually materialize remains uncertain. At the very least, however, such reporting suggests that Turkey’s diplomatic efforts and mediation-oriented posture since the outbreak of the crisis are being taken seriously.

 

2. The Impact of the Iran Crisis on the Kurdish Question

The present Iran crisis is not simply an interstate war; it has also introduced new uncertainty into regional dynamics surrounding Kurdish actors. For Turkey in particular, the key question is how instability within Iran may reshape the Kurdish political and armed networks that extend across western Iran, northern Iraq, and northern Syria. Since October 2024, negotiations with the anti-state armed group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have advanced in Turkey, and in February 2025 its leader Abdullah Öcalan called on the organization to dissolve itself and disarm.[8] Coming at a historic turning point in efforts to end more than four decades of armed conflict, this war cannot be considered unrelated to the reconciliation process within Turkey.[9]

First, Iran’s weakening as a result of the current crisis may create a window of political opportunity for Kurdish actors inside Iran. After the outbreak of the war, Iranian Kurdish organizations began presenting themselves as actors seeking to secure a certain political standing in a post-transition Iran, and coordination among several groups also appears to have advanced.[10] At present, however, these actors remain highly cautious and have shown little willingness to align themselves openly with the U.S. or Israeli strategy toward Iran. Their priority appears to be not the immediate realization of independence or autonomy, but rather the expansion of future autonomy and rights protections through the weakening of the Islamic Republic system. Accordingly, at least in the short term, the likelihood that Iranian Kurdish actors will emerge as an independent military force capable of shaping the course of the war remains low.[11]

Even so, if the war drags on and Iran’s governing capacity declines in its western borderlands, stronger cross-regional linkages around the Kurdish question cannot be ruled out. Kurdish actors across Iran, Iraq, and Syria remain embedded in distinct political processes, yet in recent years signs of mutual contact and dialogue have become increasingly visible.[12][12] Northern Iraq, in particular, is not only a rear base for Iranian Kurdish organizations but also home to PKK strongholds. Deterioration in Iran could destabilize the security environment there through the movement and redeployment of armed groups. What is likely to be especially sensitive for Turkey is the trajectory of PKK-linked networks, including the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). If a vacuum of authority or security were to emerge in western Iran, PKK-linked actors might not only reorganize on the Iranian side but also stimulate PKK networks inside Turkey, potentially slowing or derailing the ongoing dissolution and disarmament process.

In Turkey, some analysts have suggested that the PKK may be closely watching developments among Kurdish actors in Iran and the evolving vacuum of authority and security in the western borderlands, and that this in turn may contribute to a slowdown in the dissolution and disarmament process.[13] Conversely, if regional instability deepens, the Turkish government is also likely to demand stricter verification of implementation in order to prevent any reactivation of former fighters after disarmament. The issue going forward, therefore, is likely to shift away from the mere presence or absence of political will on either side and toward the practical question of how disarmament is to be verified and how the corresponding legal and political measures are to be designed.

 

3. The Challenges Facing Turkey

The challenges posed by the Iran crisis for Turkey span three broad areas: security, diplomacy, and the economy.

The first challenge is how to avoid direct involvement in the crisis while preventing its effects from eroding Turkey’s own security environment. The Iranian missiles that flew toward Turkey in March 2026 made clear that Ankara can no longer treat this crisis as an external problem. The presence of the Kürecik radar facility and Incirlik Air Base leaves Turkey liable, regardless of its own intentions, to be seen by the belligerents as part of the regional military architecture. While maintaining its principle of non-participation, Turkey must strengthen air defense, border security, and the protection of critical infrastructure, and continue to improve its crisis-management capacity so that limited provocations do not escalate into full-scale involvement.

Turkey’s response to the Iran crisis also cannot be separated from changes in the regional order surrounding the Kurdish question. Instability in western Iran may appear not simply as an Iran-specific problem, but as part of a broader reconfiguration of Kurdish actors across Syria and Iraq. In northern Syria, the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains uncertain, while in northern Iraq the balance involving pro-Iran armed groups and Kurdish actors is also in flux. These developments may intersect with the ongoing PKK disarmament and dissolution process inside Turkey, creating a situation in which three separate arenas become mutually linked. Turkey must therefore do more than simply proclaim its principle of non-participation in the war against Iran; it must strengthen its response to border instability, armed-group infiltration, and possible refugee inflows in relation to the Kurdish question as a whole.

Turkey also faces the challenge of advancing mediation diplomacy in an environment shaped not only by conflict between the parties, but also by strategic disagreement within them. Israel appears to place greater weight on weakening Iran than on achieving a ceasefire, while the Iranian side remains deeply distrustful, leaving the negotiating environment highly unstable.[14] Under such conditions, Turkey’s willingness to mediate does not automatically translate into results. What matters for Turkey is not simply expressing an intention to mediate, but helping sustain conditions under which dialogue might resume.

At the same time, the economic effects of the crisis are already visible. Constraints on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and rising energy prices are likely to affect Turkey less through a complete halt in energy supplies than through inflationary pressure, higher logistics costs, and a slowdown in exports to the Middle East. Sectors with high dependence on Middle Eastern markets—especially grains, dairy products, and processed foods—could suffer direct harm from shrinking demand and rising transport and insurance costs. The crisis therefore cannot be treated solely as a matter of diplomacy and security; it must also be addressed comprehensively from the perspective of its domestic economic impact, including on food exports, energy prices, and worsening inflation expectations.[15]

What is being asked of Turkey is whether it can, while avoiding military involvement in the war against Iran, effectively maintain its position as a mediator. To do so, it will need to pursue several tasks at once: stabilizing its borders and air defenses, preparing for renewed volatility surrounding the Kurdish question, responding to information warfare that could undermine mediation efforts, and building resilience against economic fallout.

(Completed March 29, 2026)

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