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Middle East Analysis Report

The Iran–Israel War began on June 13, 2025, with an Israeli attack on Iran. It came to a temporary halt on June 23 with the announcement of a ceasefire agreement by US President Trump and the declaration of "victory" by both Iran and Israel the following day. However, amid uncertainty about the damage to Iran's nuclear facilities — the backdrop of the initial strike — and with Iran set to negotiate with the US in the future, the danger of the Iran-Israel war resuming remains. Our researchers analyzed how regional countries, including Iran and Israel, viewed the 12-day war, as well as the possible future developments.

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Views on and Prospects of the Iran-Israel War According to Regional Actors

Middle East Institute of Japan

1. Iran's Position

According to the Iranian Ministry of Health, Israeli attacks have caused tremendous damage in Iran. As of June 26, 2025, there were 627 deaths and 4,870 were wounded on the Iranian side. These casualties were reportedly concentrated in the capital, Tehran, and the western provinces of Kermanshah. While this announcement did not distinguish between military and civilian casualties, government spokesman Mohajerani stated on August 28 that 72 women and children had been killed, including 4 pregnant women. The spokesperson also stated that seven hospitals were targeted in the attacks. On

August 29, the Iranian Judiciary (separate from the Ministry of Justice) announced that 71 people, including prison personnel, soldiers, prisoners, and family members visiting prisoners, were killed in the bombing of the Evin prison during the Israeli bombing of Tehran just before the ceasefire agreement was reached. Some non-governmental organizations estimate the death toll on the Iranian side to be close to 1,000.[1]

There was also a severe loss of high-ranking Revolutionary Guard officers, including General Bagheri, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Salami, the Commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and General Hajizadeh, the Commander of the Aerospace Forces of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and General Kazemi, the Director of the Revolutionary Guard Intelligence Organization. After General Rasheed, who had served for many years as the Commander of Khatamol Ambiya Central Base, which planned military operations under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (note that this base is separate from the Khatamol Ambiya Construction Base, which became famous for its economic activities through the Revolutionary Guard Corps) was murdered, his successor, Shadmani, was also killed on his fourth day in office... According to Israeli sources, more than 14 nuclear scientists were murdered, including the former Atomic Energy Organizaiton Director General, Abbasi.[2]

The extent of the damage to Iran's nuclear facilities is still unclear, but Foreign Minister Araghchi said it is "not small."

Amid this devastation, there is growing antagonism within the Iranian regime toward the IAEA Director General, Grossi. The regime blames him for leaking information about Iran's nuclear facilities to Israel and for preparing a report that could have triggered an Israeli attack on Iran. The day after US President Trump announced the ceasefire agreement, the Iranian parliament swiftly passed the "Suspension of Cooperation with the IAEA" law, with 221 votes in favor, 0 against, and 1 abstention. According to this law, unless Iran's national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the security of its nuclear facilities and scientists are fully guaranteed, and unless the rights enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly the right to uranium enrichment within Iran, are fully protected, and unless the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) admits those, Iran will suspend all cooperation with

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the information in “1” below is based primarily on reports published on the BBC Persian website as the primary source of information.

[2] ‘"Dast-e kam 14 daneshmand-e hasteyi"-ye iran dar jarayan-e hamalat-e isra'il koshte shodand’, *Radio Farda*, 1404/04/03.

the IAEA under the NPT and safeguards agreements.

Submitted by the Parliament's Security and Foreign Affairs Commission under the recognition that the June IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities provoked an Israeli attack on Iran, the law was approved by the Guardian Council, a body that examines laws passed by the Parliament to determine if they violate the Constitution and Islamic law, soon after its passage by the Parliament. The Speaker of Parliament, Ghalibaf, notified President Pezeshkian of the approval on the 26th, the day after the parliament passed the bill, thus obligating the government to implement the law. Everything proceeded swiftly. This suggests that there is consensus throughout the regime including the Parliament to scale back cooperation with the IAEA.

Following the National Assembly's approval of the law, Foreign Minister Araghchi stated, "The law does not entirely preclude relations with the IAEA. It is up to the SNSC to decide on that," suggesting that the relationship with the IAEA should be maintained. However, after witnessing the law's swift passage, Araghchi tweeted on June 27 that the Iranian Parliament's passage of the law, suspending cooperation with the IAEA, was a "direct result of @rafaelmgrossi's regrettable role". He noted that, through Grossi's "malign" action, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a political resolution against Iran, which led to the illegal bombing by Israel and the US. His remarks shows that he also went along with anti-IAEA and anti-Grossi sentiments within the regime.

On June 28, the hard-liner conservative newspaper Kayhan (whose publisher was appointed by Supreme Leader Khamenei) published an editorial arguing that Grossi was "a spy with a Mossad tag." The editorial went so far as to argue that Grossi should be arrested, tried, and executed for spying for Mossad and participating in the murder of Iranian citizens if he were to visit Iran again.[3] In an interview with CBS, Iran's permanent representative to the UN, Iravani, said that the IAEA inspectors' activities would be suspended, but not harmed. He condemned Kayhan's article. However, it is highly unlikely that the anti-IAEA atmosphere within the regime will dissipate easily. The argument for Iran's withdrawal from the NPT will be a subject of serious discussion in the future.

After the "Suspension of Cooperation with the IAEA" law was passed, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf said, "Iran is not pursuing the production of nuclear weapons." An Iranian diplomatic source confirmed that Supreme

[3] 'Goft o shonud: boland-martabe!' *Kayhan*, 1404/04/07, p. 2.

Leader Khamenei's fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons would remain in effect indefinitely, even after his death.[4] However, if Iran continues its nuclear activities in secret, outside the IAEA's supervision, arguments denying Iran's nuclear weapons development based on Ayatollah Khamenei's fatwa will not convince the international community. If Iran continues its enrichment activities outside of IAEA surveillance, there is a greater chance that Israel and the US will attack Iran more "audaciously" than during the "12-Day War."

2. Israel's Position

As of June 24, Israeli casualties reported during the June 13 – 24 engagement with Iran were as follows:[5]

Twenty-eight people were killed, 27 were civilians, and more than 3,000 were injured.
Of those, 3,238 are currently receiving medical treatment. Of these, 23 were severely injured.
More than 9,000 people have been internally displaced.
Iran launched approximately 550 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones, 90% of which were intercepted.
Of these, more than 31 landed in densely populated areas or critical infrastructure.
-Nearly all the drones were intercepted; only one hit a densely populated area (a house).
-A total of 21,000 alerts were issued.

Although the missiles landed on a power plant in Ashdod and an oil refinery in Haifa, the difference in damage was obvious compared to that caused by Iran, whose nuclear facilities were damaged. This was particularly evident when considering the number of deaths (over 600 in Iran). In light of this, on March 24, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared a ceasefire with Iran and announced, "We have achieved a historic victory by eliminating two fundamental threats: nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles."[6]

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[4] From a discussion with our institute's researcher, conducted on June 27.
[5] "The Israel-Iran war by the numbers, after 12 days of fighting," *Times of Israel*, 24 June, 2025.
[6] "Netanyahu claims 'historic victory,' says 'we sent Iran's nuclear program down the drain'," *Times of Israel*, 25 June, 2025.

However, this statement does not dismiss Israel's wariness toward Iran or the possibility of another attack. The reasons for this are as follows:

First, while the extent of the damage to Iran's nuclear facilities is unclear, the threat Iran poses to Israel has not entirely disappeared. On the 25th, for example, the IDF announced its view that Iran's nuclear program has been "delayed by several years" but that it is "too early" to be certain of this. Thus, Israel's essential goal of eliminating the threat of attack on Iran remains unmet.

Iran's threat to Israel extends beyond the hardware of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to include the software that operates these weapons. In other words, the existence of the Iranian regime depends on antagonizing Israel. After the ceasefire took effect, Defense Minister Katz said in a national television interview that during the 12-day engagement, the Israeli forces had planned to kill Supreme Leader Khamenei but lost the opportunity when he went underground and could not be located.[7] Although it has not been an explicit military objective of Supreme Leader Khamenei, there is no doubt that he views Israel as an effective means of neutralizing Iran. If the Islamic regime survives with him at its head and becomes more anti-Israeli through his declaration of victory and Shiite religious ceremonies, such as Ashura, which is scheduled for around July 6, then, from Israel's perspective, the 12-Day War was merely a threat. However, the cause of this threat remains unclear.

In light of this, perhaps Israel had little need for a ceasefire with Iran. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to a ceasefire to save face with President Trump, who wanted credit for brokering the ceasefire between the two nations. In this context, we can discern certain considerations in Defense Minister Katz's statement. The Israeli position that they could not kill Supreme Leader Khamenei makes it easier for the Iranians to declare "victory." By having both Israel and Iran declare "victory" and put an end to the contradiction, President Trump could demonstrate his role as a power broker.

Nevertheless, declaring “victory” would reflect Netanyahu's confident recognition. The October 2024 attack on the Iranian mainland — the first in Israel's history — followed by the June 2025 engagement, in which Israel demonstrated its military superiority, and the US and other countries' military support for Israel,[8] as well as the unprecedented long-range dogfight, should

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[7] “Katz says Israel sought to kill Khamenei, but didn’t find an opportunity,” *Times of Israel*, 27 June, 2025.

[8] France has announced its participation in Iranian drone intercepts on the Israeli mainland. “France says it intercepted drones targeting Israel during Iran war,” *Times of*

have given Israel confidence that it could win any future engagement with Iran. If so, as Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons and build nuclear-capable ballistic missiles under the current regime and these launches (either hard or soft, as described above) become a reality, Israel will have ample confirmation of the need for renewed attacks on Iran.

President Trump's goals were not confined to the ceasefire between Iran and Israel. At the heart of his Middle Eastern intervention lies Palestine. The "Deal of the Century," announced in January 2020, recognized Israel's control of Palestinian territories. Trump has long been interested in achieving peace in the Middle East and creating a lasting legacy. However, unlike in his first term, any discussion of Middle East peace must first end the Gaza War. For President Trump, ending the Gaza War would enable a compromise between Israel and the Arab States. The expansion of the Abraham Accords provides a blueprint for a more robust security environment for Israel.[9] While this logic is acceptable and supportable, Prime Minister Netanyahu believes in the continuation of the Gaza War for his political survival, including regaining support at home. He may also reject President Trump's strong demand for an immediate end to the war.

3. Turkey's Position

Since the Israeli attack on Iran, Turkey has consistently urged all parties to exercise restraint and refrain from taking actions that could further escalate regional tensions. It has repeatedly stressed the need for a diplomatic resolution. To this end on June 14 and 15, immediately following the attack, President Erdogan held telephone conversations with seven leaders, including the US President Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. On June 15, Erdoğan held a second round of talks with President Trump, President Pezeshkian, and four other leaders, underscoring Turkey's diplomatic efforts toward de-escalation.[10] At the same time, regarding the US airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities on April 22, Turkey expressed concern, characterizing the strike as "an action that could lead to serious consequences." However, it stopped short of directly condemning the

Israel, 26 June, 2025.

[9] "Netanyahu, Trump said working on plan to end Gaza war and expand Abraham Accords," *Times of Israel*, 27 June, 2025.

[10] "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, İsrail'in İran'a yönelik saldırılarına ilişkin telefon diplomasisini sürdürüyor," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 15 Haziran, 2025.

US[11] This cautious stance response appears rooted in Turkey's longstanding apprehension over Iran's nuclear ambitions, as well as in a pragmatic calculation to maintain its regional presence while avoiding a deterioration in relations with the US and other Western allies. Given its already strained relations with Israel, Turkey, is not in a position to offer mediation between Iran and Israel. Nevertheless, leveraging its positive ties with President Trump, Turkey appears to be seeking a role as an intermediary between the US and Iran, thereby reinforcing its diplomatic channels with Washington.

More fundamentally, Turkey is concerned that military actions by Israel, Iran, and the US could spill over into neighboring regions such as Syria and Iraq, posing a direct threat to Turkish national security. The activities of Iran-backed militias, Hezbollah, and factions affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) near Turkey's southern borders are of particular concern, and are viewed by Ankara as distinct from the Gaza conflict—a strategic risk closely linked to Turkey's counterterrorism priorities.[12]

At the held on June 24, Turkey skillfully used the crisis to gain diplomatic leverage. It successfully secured the inclusion of the phrase "the fight against terrorism is part of collective defense" in the summit's joint statement and also obtained agreement to host the 2026 NATO summit. These achievements enabled Turkey to highlight both its role in containing regional instability and its continuing strategic importance within the alliance.

In this context, Turkey's diplomatic approach is centered on mediation, with an emphasis on avoiding direct military involvement. The war between Israel and Iran presents both a security threat and an opportunity: a chance for Turkey to demonstrate its capacity as a mediator and to enhance its relations with the United States. Whether Turkey can sustain and reinforce this position will be a key factor in determining its future influence in the evolving Middle Eastern order.

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[11] Although the Foreign Ministry's statement includes strong wording, —asserting that "U.S. strikes" have "maximized the risk of escalating the conflict to a global level," following the escalation triggered by Israel's June 13 attacks—it notably avoids the use of the word *kınama* ("condemnation"). "No: 125, 22 Haziran 2025, ABD'nin İran'ın Nükleer Tesislerine Gerçekleştirdiği Saldırı Hk.," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, 22 Haziran, 2025.

[12] "Caught in the crossfire: How the Iran-Israel war undermines Erdoğan's agenda," *Middle East Institute,* 20 June, 2025.

4. GCC's Position

Beginning with the 2023 Saudi-Iran Diplomatic Reciprocity Agreement, the GCC countries steadily improved their relations with Iran. Qatar and the UAE, which emphasized and maintained relations with Iran despite the Saudi-Iranian tensions, have further activated economic ties. Bahrain, which, along with Saudi Arabia, broke ties with Iran in 2016, initiated talks on restoring relations with Iran at a foreign ministers' meeting in June 2024.

This was evident in its stance on the Gaza War in October 2023. Even as Israel and the US attempted to isolate Iran as a destabilizing factor in the region, and even as Iran carried out a reported attack on Israel in October 2024, the GCC countries maintained diplomatic channels with the country to avoid a situation in which Iran would be isolated. Similarly, during the Iran-Israel War in June 2025, they did not officially support Iran's military actions, nor did they strongly condemn Iran. In this case, the US maintained a stance that could be seen as "pro-Iran" from the Israeli and US perspectives.

This attitude was evident in Iran's response to the June 23rd attack on the US military base in Qatar (the Udayd Air Base). Although Qatar and the other GCC countries issued statements condemning the attack as a violation of their sovereignty and rights, none strongly condemned Iran. Instead, they expressed concern about the circumstances that led Iran to take such actions, suggesting that Israel and the US were partly to blame.[13] No country was willing to worsen its relations with Iran because of this attack. Qatar even emphasized its role in admonishing Iran. For example, Emir Tamim held a telephone conversation with Iranian President Pezeshkian on March 24. During the conversation, Emir Tamim called for a resolution of the situation through negotiations and dialogue.[14]

Given their economic dependence on energy exports and investment, the GCC countries want to avoid a situation in which instability in the region leads to heightened regional risk from foreign perspectives. For this reason, since 2023, they opted for the incorporation rather than the suppression of Iran. In light of this, various countries' responses indicate that they do not want to reverse progress due to the Gaza War or the Iran-Israel War.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Iran's nuclear weapons program poses a potential threat to the GCC countries. The countries do not unilaterally

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[13] https://x.com/MofaQatar_EN/status/1937217262479638563

[14] "Amir receives phone call from Iranian President," *Peninsula*, 24 June, 2025.

condemn the neutralization of Iran by Israel and the US. Rather, they would like to discourage Israel from further military deployment in the region under the assumption that the threat level from Iran has decreased. In short, they want to end the war and advance peace in the Middle East to compensate for the low-profile situation that had existed since the beginning of the Gaza War. One notable event that marked the beginning of this process was the Palestinian conference co-hosted by Saudi Arabia and France. Originally scheduled for June 17–20, the conference was postponed because of the Iran–Israel War. While European countries supported Israel's right to self-defense in the Iran-Israel War, they have since condemned Israel for the Gaza War and the Palestinian situation. The GCC countries intend to leverage this logic to separate the Palestinian issue from the Iranian issue, restrain Israel, and assert their influence in the region to restructure the regional order. The GCC countries will try to use the European countries' logic of separating the Palestinian issue from the Iranian one to deter Israel and exert their influence on the restructuring of the regional order.

5. Impact on Energy Situation

The conflict between Iran and Israel has negatively impacted the energy industries of both countries.

On June 13, the Israeli Ministry of Energy ordered operating companies to suspend operations in the offshore Leviathan and Karish gas fields because of the deteriorating situation caused by the fighting with Iran. Following the ceasefire, the Ministry ordered the resumption of production in the aforementioned gas fields on June 25. The Chevron Corporation of the US, which operates the Leviathan gas field project, announced that it began supplying gas from the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields to Israel and neighboring countries such as Egypt and Jordan. Additionally, the UK-based Energean, a participant in the Karish gas field project, announced that it was working to resume its operations.

Although Israel's gas production facilities were not attacked by Iran, the losses from the nearly 2-week shutdown were estimated to be $12 million for the Leviathan gas field and $39 million for the Karish gas field.[15] During that time, Israel prioritized domestic supply and suspended gas exports to Egypt for six days. This resulted in Egypt's inability to secure gas for industrial use, which

[15] "Israel Orders Reopening of Biggest Gas Field After Ceasefire'," *Bloomberg*, 25 June, 2025.

exacerbated gas shortages.

In the event of another Iran-Israel war, Israel's inadequate missile defense system could jeopardize the continuation of the gas field project. Should fighting between Israel and Iran occur again in the future, security concerns could delay gas field expansion plans and new development projects in Israel.[16]

Figure Gas Field of Israel

Source: Middle East Economic Survey

Israel then attacked a gas facility in Iran on June 14, temporarily halting production. This facility is connected to the South Pars gas field located off the coast of Iran. The field supplies approximately two-thirds of Iran's total gas. Iran repaired the facility and announced the resumption of operations on June 26.[17]

In economic terms, the decline in gas production in Iran is a matter of both life and death. Natural gas can be reinjected into oil fields to increase oil production, and is also used as fuel for gas-fired power generation, which is the main source of power. Natural gas is an important source of foreign exchange from exports to Turkey and Iraq. Given the importance of gas in Iran, Israel may continue to target its gas facilities.

One point to keep in mind regarding energy is that if fighting flares up, depending on the progress of the Iranian nuclear issue, the risk of a Strait of Hormuz blockade will increase once again. Recently, the Iranian Parliament approved a plan to block the Strait of Hormuz in response to a potential US military attack on its nuclear facilities. Although Iran's Supreme Council for National Security had to approve the blockade, Iran began considering it a political card to check the US, which is aligned with Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz is an important chokepoint for maritime traffic. It has

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[16] In June 2024, the Leviathan gas field project approved a plan to increase gas production from 12 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year to 21 BCM. Additionally, SOCAR and Energean have each begun work on new gas field projects offshore Israel.

[17] "Damaged unit of Iran's South Pars refinery back operating, Nour News says," *Reuters*, 26 June, 2025.

sufficient water depth and width to serve as the world's largest crude oil tanker. More than 25% of the world's maritime traffic and approximately 20% of the world's oil consumption occur in this area. As for natural gas, about 20% of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz.[18]

Although large volumes of oil and LNG pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily, alternative export routes that can bypass the strait are limited. [19] Unlike the Red Sea, there are no alternative routes through the strait.[20] Therefore, a disruption in logistics due to an inability to navigate would have a serious impact on the global energy market. Conversely, a blockade in the Strait of Hormuz would also affect China, Iran's largest crude oil export destination, and the Gulf countries with which Iran has been improving its relations.

(END)

[18] "Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint," U.S. Energy Information Administration, 16 June, 2025.

[19] There are two pipelines that can export crude oil by bypassing the Strait of Hormuz: Saudi Arabia's East-West crude oil pipeline, which has a transport capacity of 5 million barrels per day (bpd), and the crude oil pipeline leading to Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has a transport capacity of 1.5 million bpd. However, with a total transport capacity of 6.5 million bpd, it would be difficult to cover the current transit volume if the Strait of Hormuz were to be blocked.

[20] In the Red Sea, Yemen-based Houthi groups have been attacking Israeli-affiliated merchant ships since the start of the Gaza War in 2023, forcing many vessels to avoid the Red Sea side of the route and divert to the Cape of Good Hope route.